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Abstract
We analyze theoretically banks’ choice of organizational structures in branches,
subsidiaries or stand-alone banks, in the presence of public bailouts and default costs.
These structures are characterized by different arrangements for internal rescue of af-
filiates against default. The cost of debt and leverage are endogenous. For moderate
bailout probabilities, subsidiary structures, wherein the two entities provide mutual
internal rescue under limited liability, have the highest group value, but also the high-
est risk taking as measured by leverage and expected loss. We explore the effect of
constraints on leverage and policy implications. The conflict of interests between reg-
ulators, who minimize systemic risk, and banks, who maximize their own value, is
mitigated when capital requirements are effective.
KEYWORDS: bank organization, bank risk, financial synergies, endogenous lever-
age in banking, default costs, bailouts
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1 Introduction
The international debate on banking regulation after the financial crisis 2007-2009 covers a
variety of regulatory proposals in addition to capital requirements. These proposals include
separation or ”ring-fencing” of traditional commercial banking from other financial services
and special resolution procedures for banks and other financial institutions. The motivation
for the new regulatory initiatives seems to be concerns about the effectiveness of capital
requirements to reduce risk-taking in the presence of strong incentives to exploit an implicit
subsidy to debt-financing. This subsidy is generated by explicit and implicit protection of
banks’ creditors against losses from bank failures. There is a large literature on effects of
capital requirements but there is little analysis of the impact of regulation of organizational
structures such as ring-fencing on banks’ incentives to take risk with potential systemic
consequences.
In this paper we analyze value and risk effects of a multi-affiliate banking group’s orga-
nizational choice between branch and subsidiary structures. The group may also choose to
divest affiliates to create stand-alone banks. The banking group’s choices with respect to
organizational structure are analyzed in the presence and absence of capital regulation in the
form of an effective constraint on leverage in each affiliate or the whole group. The group
value of each organizational structure depends on the financial synergies that the bank can
exploit within the structure. These synergies arise in the presence of default costs, taxes and
a probability of state bailout. Systemic risk effects of the organizational choice are analyzed
with the purpose to identify conditions that give rise to a conflict of interest between the
banking group’s value objective and a regulator’s objective to minimize systemic risk. The
interest rate on bank debt, as well as leverage in each affiliate, is endogenous in the absence
of leverage constraints while only the interest rate is endogenous when capital requirements
are imposed.
An affiliate is defined by its separate distribution of returns on assets, which may be more
or less correlated with the distribution of another affiliate. Our multi-affiliate banking group
may have affiliates in more than one country or it may be a conglomerate bank with, for
example, a traditional commercial bank affiliate and an investment bank affiliate. Organi-
zational structures are defined within our model by the degree of separation or ring-fencing
of the capital base of each affiliate, which depends on internal arrangements for support of
an insolvent affiliate from other affiliates. On the one extreme there is a branch structure
wherein the affiliates have a joint capital base.1This means that the affiliates support each
other through internal asset transfers till the point of joint default. On the other extreme
the affiliates are separated as stand-alone banks with their own capital bases. In this case
assets in one entity cannot be used to support the other entity.2
1Traditionally universal banks were financial conglomerates supplying a variety of financial services in
addition to deposit taking and direct lending within one legal entity. More recently the different activities
within conglomerates are often organized in subsidiaries under a Bank Holding Company in the US as well as
in Europe. These banking groups are often strongly integrated both operationally and financially (Alexander,
2015).
2Our stand-alone banks may either be completely independent banks with different owners or financially
completely independent subsidiaries with common ownership.
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In between the two extremes there are subsidiary structures wherein each affiliate is a
separate legal entity with limited liability but there are opportunities for support from one
affiliate to another. As a result of the limited liability for each legally separate affiliate
the support from one affiliate to another is constrained by the supporting affiliate’s capital.
Unlike in the branch structure, each affiliate can default without dragging other affiliates into
default.3 We distinguish between subsidiary structures with “mutual rescue” and subsidiary
structures with “one-way rescue.” In the former structure, each affiliate within a banking
group supports another affiliate that has exhausted its capital but the support ends before
the supporting affiliate defaults. In the one-way rescue structure, support goes only one way
from, for example, a parent to a subsidiary.4
Value differences among organizational structures exist because the internal rescue ar-
rangements among affiliates with or without limited liability affect the banking group’s ability
to reduce default costs, and the ability to exploit benefits from a tax shield and a probability
of state bailouts. Capital requirements also affect the benefits from these sources of financial
synergies.
A regulator’s concern with systemic risk in different organizational structures is captured
by a comparison of the expected losses of the creditors of the banking group. If the structure
that maximizes group value contributes the most to systemic risk there is a potential conflict
between the objectives of the bank and the objectives of the regulator. We show that the
conflict of interest between the regulator’s objective of minimizing systemic risk and the
banking group’s objective is mitigated when capital requirements are effective. One policy
implication is that restrictions on organizational choice can serve as a substitute for capital
requirements or be used as a complement to capital requirements when banking groups are
able to evade these requirements.5 The literature indicates that capital requirements are
neither completely effective nor completely ineffective.6
A preview of our main results with respect to value and risk effects of organizational
choice is as follows. With endogenous leverage subsidiary structures, and particularly those
providing mutual rescue, have the highest group values, but also the highest risk taking, as
measured by leverage and expected losses as long as default cost, probability of bailout and
tax parameters are the same across affiliates, Branch structures as well as stand-alone banks
contribute less to systemic risk, but have also smaller value to shareholders.
The value advantage of the subsidiary structures remains when a binding and identical
3Internal rescue arrangements depend on the financing and allocation of equity among affiliates within
a group, and can take the form of explicit guarantees of a subsidiary’s debt or a bank holding company’s
responsibility for several subsidiaries’ debt. Internal insurance may also be more informal. For example, a
parent firm facing distress can sell subsidiaries’ assets in order to save itself or, if a subsidiary is facing distress,
the parent can transfer assets to protect the bank’s brand name. Debt financing of equity in a subsidiary
(double leverage) can also be viewed as an internal rescue arrangement since losses of the subsidiary are
transferred to the parent.
4At present, organizational structures like bank-holding companies (BHCs) in the US are usually char-
acterized by strong integration of subsidiaries operationally as well as financially (Carmassi and Herring,
2015). There are also BHCs with relatively independent subsidiaries that are able to default individually
without threatening all entities under a BHC’s control.
5There is evidence that banks are able to manipulate risk-weighting schemes as they are specified in the
Basel Accords (see , for example, Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2013).
6See, for example, Blum (1999) and Hovakimian and Kane (2001).
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leverage constraint is imposed on each affiliate as long as the probability of state bailout is low
or moderate. At relatively high probabilities of state bailout the stand-alone banks obtain
the highest value, followed by subsidiaries with one-way rescue, subidiaries with mutual
rescue and branch structures that offer unlimited internal rescue.
We also allow probabilities of state bailouts to differ across affiliates in different countries
or affiliates supplying different kinds of services. The most striking result in this case is that
the value disadvantage of the branch structure diminishes while its contribution to systemic
risk becomes the highest.
The analysis proceeds as follows: related literature is reviewed in section 2. The basic
model for valuation of stand-alone banks is set up in section 3. The trade-off between de-
fault costs, on the one hand, and the put option value of limited liability, the likelihood of a
government bailout and the tax shield from deposits, on the other, is formulated. In section
4 the bank expands by adding an affiliate as a subsidiary or a branch. Their coinsurance or
internal rescue features are formulated in this section. Analytical results for the group values
of subsidiary, branch and stand-alone organizations are derived in section 5 with constrained
leverage. The notion of debt diversity also emerges here when leverage is unconstrained.
Numerical analysis of optimally levered banks follows in section 6. Systemic risk is intro-
duced in section 7, where we show how the trade-off between increasing the group value and
reducing the expected loss depends on the organizational structure and on the regulatory
constraints that can be imposed. In section 8 we summarize results, discuss implications for
current reform proposals and further research.
2 Background Literature
The theoretical analysis of risk and efficiency in bank organizations in this paper is related
to several strands of literature. An important strand includes perfect-information theoretical
models of banking groups, which have to organize themselves as branches versus subsidiaries.
Within this strand, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010), for instance, analyze theoretically the
choice between branches and subsidiaries in banking. They model the choice as a trade-off
between benefits of limited liability for a subsidiary and protection against political risk (of
expropriation) in a branch. The international dimension inherent in their set-up is not our
main focus. That is why we will not have political risk.
Financial synergies play an important role also in Freixas, Loranth and Morrison (2007),
which considers a financial conglomerate wherein activities are risky to different degrees.
The activities can be conducted in an integrated entity subject to one liability constraint–
a branch bank in our terminology–or within a holding company structure with financially
independent subsidiaries. These would be stand-alone banks in our setting, but - differently
from our stand-alone banks - they would be able to shift assets with different risk between
themselves. The paper also considers stand-alone, independently owned financial institutions
without ability to transfer assets between them. In our model risk can be shifted between
subsidiaries only through increased leverage in one entity while asset transfers occur only if
subsidiries rescue each other. A general result we have in common with Freixas et al. (2007)
is that optimal capital requirements must be differentiated across different organizational
structures as well as different costs of default and state bailout schemes.
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Another important strand includes theoretical models where organizations in branches
or subsidiaries differ in transmission of information. Kahn and Winton (2004) emphasize
moral hazard incentives to shift risk to debt-holders who cannot observe the riskiness of
the different activities within a financial conglomerate. Since the debt-holders know that
they do not have risk-information, the financial institution can reduce its cost of funding
by separating the financing of high-risk and low-risk activities into different entities with
different leverage. In our model debt-holders know the risk characteristics of assets so that
risk is reflected in interest rates. Benefits of subsidiary structures occur only as a result of
internal insurance arrangements, which are not present in Kahn and Winton.7
There is a third relevant strand of literature, that studies financial synergies arising as a
result of the merger of two firms, which are not banks. Leland (2007) and Banal-Estanol,
Ottaviani and Winton (2013) show that when two stand-alone firms are merged into one
legal entity the new firm cannot take advantage of limited liability but it can benefit from
reduced default costs. Banal-Estanol et al. (2013) restrict the analysis to debt financing and
the effects of the merger of two firms on default costs, while the merged firm re-optimizes
leverage in the Leland (2007) paper. The paper also considers tax-effects of the endogenous
choice between debt and equity. In this case, the merged firm always benefit from reduced
default costs while with fixed leverage a ‘contamination effect’ within the merged organization
can cause the default costs to rise above the default costs of the separately financed firms.
Limited internal insurance between subsidiaries is not considered in these papers. Luciano
and Nicodano (2014) expands on the analysis in Leland (2007) and considers that a parent
plus a subsidiary, which can be rescued by the parent, can economize on default costs relative
to the merged firm. These papers also endogenize both leverage and the interest rate on debt.
They focus on the organizational choice as a trade-off between default costs and tax-savings
from debt financing. We depart from the model in Luciano and Nicodano (2014) because
an essential feauture of banks in comparison with other corporates is the presence of public
bailout. Furthermore, we extend their analysis to mutual rescue and stand-alone entities.
The last strand comprehends the empirical literature. Our rescues take the form of asset
transfers and, as we will see, implied risk transfer. The empirical examination of asset trans-
fers in Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia and Martinez Peria (2007) already motivated Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2010). Cross-border flows are documented empirically by Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2012). Jeon, Olivero and wuW (2013) study the transmission of shocks generated by such
flows. Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) analyze empirically how cross-border banks shift
risk between countries with different regulation. Another piece of empirical literature with
bearing on our model is Gropp and Heider (2010), which shows that the traditional deter-
minants of capital structure in non-financial firms carry over to banks. The paper argues
that mispriced deposit insurance and capital requirements are less important. Tsesmelidakis
and Merton (2012), on the other hand, reveals evidence from bond yields for 74 US banks,
2007-2011, that the implicit subsidy to bondholders and shareholders of banks considered
’too big to fail’ amounted to $353bn. The authors use a typical corporate-finance model
inspired by Merton’s (1974) equity and debt valuation. Our approach to determine endoge-
7Financial dependence among subsidiaries may arise as a result of intra-corporate lending as well. The
basis for intra-corporate lending is usually internal information advantages or internal tax arbitrage. See,
for example, Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), and Shin and Stulz (1998). In our model financial
interdependence depends only on internal rescue arrangements since lenders are fully informed.
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nous leverage in banks is based on the same valuation principles. Last, let us mention that
the presence and effects of rescues, or internal insurance within banking groups, which is the
main mechanism behing our model, has been documented empirically by Bradley and Jones
(2008) and Ashcraft (2004).
3 The stand-alone bank
This section models a single and then two stand-alone (SA) bank using as a starting point the
structural model of Merton (1974) and introducing default costs, taxes and the possibility
of public (also called ”governmental” below) bailout in default. These factors create an
incentive to adjust leverage so as to exploit lower taxes and the possibility of bailout, and
to reduce default costs.8
For the sake of simplicity, consider two points in time only, t = 0, T, and classify bank
liabilities into deposits9 and equity. Both deposits and equity are evaluated at fair value,
D0 and E0, under the assumption that investors are risk-neutral or arbitrages are ruled
out.10 The face value of deposits is denoted by F . D0 is the expected value of their final
payoff, discounted. This means that the rate on deposits is endogenous, and competitively
determined.11 F −D0 is the capital gain to debt holders.
To simplify, we label as “loans” all the bank assets.12 The initial value of loans is denoted
as L0. The value of loans at time T is a non-negative random variable - which we take to
be continuous - denoted as L(T ). At time T the bank collects the value of loans L(T ), net
of corporate taxes. The tax rate is k > 0, but there is a tax shield on passive interest rates,
F −D0. Thereby, the bank’s total cash flows are:
L̄(T ) = (1− k)L(T ) + k(F −D0), (1)
These cash flows are distributed to bond and equity holders according to absolute priority:
depositors receive F, either if there is no default, which means that the asset value L̄(T ) is
greater than F, or if it is smaller but the government bails out the bank’s creditors.13 There
is a probability π that this occurs. If there is no bailout, they receive the asset value, net
of default costs. The latter are proportional to total cash flows, αL̄(T ). The value to be
8The main distinguishing characteristic of a bank relative to any corporation for from the point of view
of financial synergies is the existence of a positive probability of a bailout by the government. A second
important characteristic of a bank for our purposes is the potential systemic consequences of a bank’s default.
9Deposits represent customer as well as interbank net deposits, borrowing from the Central Bank and
issued bonds.
10This assumption is discussed in Merton (1974) and is adopted in both Leland (2007) and Luciano and
Nicodano (2014).
11This is accomplished by imposing a zero profit condition. Thereby we capture the long-term incentives
to choose a particular internal insurance arrangement although we lose the ability to analyze short term
effects of imperfect competition.
12We disregard interbank claims and consider as a unique entity proper loans and securities. In doing that
we have in mind mainly commercial banks.
13Here and in the sequel we disregard the case of equality between asset value and face value of debt,
thanks to the hypothesis of continuity of loans as a random variable. The event of equality has indeed zero
probability.
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distributed to depositors becomes the sum of what equity holders pay to debt holders, out
of L̄(T ), what they receive from the government in case of bailout, less default costs if there
is no bailout :
min(F, L̄(T )) + (F − L̄(T ))1{L̄(T )<F,B} − αL̄(T )1{L̄(T )<F,B̄}, (2)
where 1{E} is the default indicator of event E, which is equal to one if and only if E occurs,
B is the event of bailout, B̄ the event of no bailout. The value of debt is the expectation of
such payoff, discounted at the riskless rate r:
D0 = exp(−rT )×
×
{
Emin(F, L̄(T )) + πEmax(F − L̄(T ), 0)− α(1− π)E
[
L̄(T )1{L̄(T )<F}
]}
(3)
where π is the probability of bailout, given that default occurred. Following Merton (1974),
it is easy to argue that the first term is the difference between the face value of deposits
discounted and a put on loans, with strike F . The second term is the so-called ”default put”:
a put option on L, with strike F , which is paid with probability π. The third represents
expected default costs. Collecting the put terms, we have
D0 = exp(−rT )
{
F − (1− π)Emax(0, F − L̄(T ))
−α(1− π)E
[
L̄(T )1{L̄(T )<F}
]
}
(4)
It follows from absolute priority that the payoff to equity at T is max
[
L̄(T )− F, 0
]
. Equity
holders are long a call on loans’ net value, with strike F . E0 is then
E0 = exp(−rT )Emax
[
L̄(T )− F, 0
]
. (5)
The value of one stand-alone bank V SA, namely the sum of debt and equity, can be proven
to be equal to the unlevered value L0, plus the bailout put minus expected default costs:
V SA = D0 + E0 =
= L̄0 + exp(−rT )πEmax(0, F − L̄(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
bailout put
− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
L̄(T )1{L̄(T )<F}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default costs
. (6)
The bank chooses the (non-negative) face value of deposits in order to maximize V SA, since
this represents also E0 and the deposits that equity holders cash in at time 0, namely D0.
1415
Stand-alone banks are defined here as entities that commit to no rescue. If we have two
stand-alone banks, their total value - which we denote as GV SA - is the sum of their values,
2V SA. Leverage would be chosen independently by each entity.
14If ever there are no default costs, no taxes and no bailout, the bank value D0 +E0 reduces to the initial
loan value L0: an irrelevance property of the Modigliani-Miller type holds in this case since leverage does
not affect the bank value.
15It should be clear from the payoffs to debt and equity - both in this case and the ones to follow - that
we could equally well have taken deposits as given and solved for the amount of loans.
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4 A bank with two affiliates
We model a bank with two affiliates – that we call a home bank and a subsidiary or a branch
– by specifying its financial synergies, which are affected by coinsurance between the affiliates
in case of default.
The loans of the home bank, subsidiary and branch are
L̄i(T ) = (1− k)Li(T ) + k(Fi −D0i), i = h, s, b (7)
To compare the different structures, we set gross–of-tax loans in branches equal (in distri-
bution) to those in subsidiaries Lb(T ) = Ls(T ). For technical tractability, we also introduce
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The joint density of Lh(T ) and Lb(T ) = Ls(T ) has non-null density
over the whole positive orthant of R2.16
The overall group value with two affiliates is
GVj = D0h + E0h +D0a + E0a (8)
where we have a = s, b, depending on whether we are in the subsidiary or branch structure,
and j = MR for the mutual rescue structure, OWR for the one-way-rescue structure, BR
for the branch structure. Rescue consists of providing the defaulted subsidiary with assets
at T . By specifying when rescue occurs and how much asset transfer it entails, we obtain
the group value in different organizations.
4.1 Rescue in the subsidiary organization
When two banks organize themselves in being a home bank and its subsidiary, they remain
two separate legal entities. If rescue is conditional on not endangering the safety of the
home bank and vice versa, we have mutual insurance. If ever the insurance works only from
the home to the subsidiary or vice versa, we have one-way insurance. In principle, debt in
different affiliates could have different seniority. It might well happen, for instance, that debt
of the subsidiary is divided into a senior and a junior tranche, and the parent committs to
rescue only the senior part, not the junior. And viceversa. The model below is meant to
represent the situation resulting from given, crystalized seniority, possibly different across
affiliates, but uniform within each affiliate. If the debt of each affiliate is stratified into
different seniority levels, and not all of them are guaranteed, the model has to be changed
accordingly.17
16The Gaussian distribution on loan log-returns introduced later satisfies this hypothesis, which is needed
only in order to simplify the discussion and avoid having events of null probability, as well as perfectly
correlated returns (positively and negatively).
17If only a fraction bi of the debt of affiliate i is guaranteed, because of its seniority, only that fraction will
be rescued, and the formulas from (9) to (12) below must contain bi(F − L̄i) instead of F − L̄i. Different
specifications of bi for different affiliates can be envisaged.
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4.1.1 Mutual rescue
Rescue of the subsidiary means that the home bank using its surplus, L̄h(T ) − Fh, pays
that part of the subsidiary deposits that are not covered by the subsidiary’s own assets,
Fs − L̄s(T ). The home-bank can do this without facing default if its surplus is greater than
the amount needed for rescue, L̄h(T ) − Fh > Fs − L̄s(T ). The rescue occurs if and only if
the home bank is not in default (L̄h(T ) > Fh), the subsidiary is in default (L̄s(T ) < Fs) and
rescuing the subsidiary does not drive the home bank into default. Since the first condition
is always satisfied when the last is, the conditions can be reduced to the event
Rs ,
{
L̄s(T ) < Fs
L̄h(T )− Fh > Fs − L̄s(T ) (9)
The subsidiary is not rescued if it is in default and the home bank does not have enough
assets to cover the subsidiary’s shortage of assets relative to the face value of debt:
Qs ,
{
L̄s(T ) < Fs
L̄h(T )− Fh < Fs − L̄s(T ) (10)
Symmetrically, rescue of the home bank by the subsidiary takes place when the latter is not
in default and is not endangered by the rescue itself:
Rh ,
{
L̄h(T ) < Fh
L̄s(T )− Fs > Fh − L̄h(T ) (11)
and default of the home bank takes place if the subsidiary is endangered:
Qh ,
{
L̄h(T ) < Fh
L̄s(T )− Fs < Fh − L̄h(T ) (12)
If Qs or Qh hold true, there is room for state bailout of the defaulted bank, which occurs with
probability π.18 We assume that government intervention is independent of survivorship of
any affiliate, while we do not assume independency of the loans of the affiliates.
It follows that the payoff to depositors of the subsidiary (home) is the payoff to a stand
alone bank (denoted as ”value without bailout and rescue” below), augmented by Fi−L̄i(T ),
i = s, h, the minimum support to avoid default when rescue or bailout take place. Default
costs are paid only if there is default, no internal rescue and no bailout. That gives as debt
18In all the structures, we assume that the government can enforce rescue by threatening the bank: if
rescue does not occur ex post when due, the government does not intervene to bailout the bank in case
rescue is still not enough. Our model is indeed a perfect, symmetric information one, in which the behavior
of the bank is perfectly observable by the government. On top of that, specific legislation makes rescue
enforcable by law: this is the case of the US ”source of strenght” provision.
9
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value:
D0i = exp(−rT )
[
Fi − Emax(0, Fi − L̄i(T ))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
value without bailout and rescue
(13)
+exp(−rT )E
{[
Fi − L̄i(T )
]
1{Ri}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rescue
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fi − L̄i(T ), 0)1{Qi}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout
− exp(−rT )(1− π)αE
[
L̄i(T )1{Qi}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default costs
Since the assets for rescue of the subsidiary (home) come from the home (subsidiary)
bank, rescue diminishes the equity value of the latter bank in comparison with the stand-
alone case (5). For i, j = s, h, i 6= j:
E0i = exp(−rT )Emax
[
L̄i(T )− Fi, 0
]
− exp(−rT )E
{[
Fj − L̄j(T )
]
1{Rj}
}
,
In the mutual rescue structure the home bank chooses how many deposits to raise directly
and through its subsidiary in order to maximize the overall value, which can be written as
the sum of the asset values L̄h + L̄s plus the bailout puts, minus their default costs,which are
paid only in the absence of rescue by the other group member and in the absence of state
bailout:19
GV MR =
L̄h0 + π exp(−rT )Emax
{
0, Fh − L̄h(T ))1{Qh}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
L̄h(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+L̄s0+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fs − L̄s(T ), 0)1{Qs})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
L̄s(T )1{Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
.
(14)
where L̄i0 = (1− k)Li(0) + exp(−rT ) ks(Fi −D0i), i = h, s.
4.1.2 Unilateral rescue
Assume now that, in the subsidiary case, rescue is unilateral and can go only from the home
to the subsidiary. This means that the payoffs to the equity holders of the subsidiary and to
depositors of the home bank are as in the stand-alone case. Their fair values are:
E0s = exp(−rT )Emax
[
L̄s(T )− Fs, 0
]
(15)
19Rescue payments cancel out because they are paid by one stakeholder (equity owners of one affiliate) to
debt holders of the other.
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D0h = exp(−rT )×
×
[
Fh − (1− π)Emax(0, Fh − L̄h(T ))− α(1− π)E
[
L̄h(T )1{L̄h(T )<Fh}
]]
. (16)
The formulas for the subsidiary debt and home-bank equity of the mutual case remain in
force, since their payoffs are not affected. The overall value of the subsidiary organization
with unilateral insurance, GV OWR, is the sum of the asset values, L̄h0 +L̄s0, plus the bailout
puts for each bank, minus their default costs:
GV OWR =
L̄h0 + π exp(−rT )Emax(0, Fh − L̄h(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
+
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
L̄h(T )1{L̄h(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+L̄s0+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fs − L̄s(T ), 0)1{Qs})
}
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
L̄s(T )1{Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
. (17)
A similar decomposition of value can be obtained if rescue goes only from the subsidiary to
the home bank. Here we assume that the direction of support is the one elicited above.
4.2 Rescue in the branch organization
The branch case is different from the mutual subsidiary case because there is no more limited
liability of one bank versus the other, although analytically we treat the two entities as
separate since they have separate return distributions. In the branch case, insolvency for
the whole bank organization is the only possibility: either both the home and the branch
default, or none does. Rescue is mutual but not conditional on survivorship of the entity
coming to rescue. So, support from the home bank to the branch is offered whenever
Rb ,
{
L̄h(T ) > Fh
L̄b(T ) < Fb
(18)
while support in the other direction occurs when
R′h ,
{
L̄h(T ) < Fh
L̄b(T ) > Fb
(19)
These events substitute for Rs, Rb. The transfer in the two events is
min
(
L̄h(T )− Fh, Fb − L̄b(T )
)
,
min
(
L̄b(T )− Fb, Fh − L̄h(T )
)
.
As in the parent-subsidiary case, the transfer is the minimum of the difference between
the face value of debt of one affiliate and its own cash flows, and the extra-cash-flows of
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the guarantor. These extra-cash-flows do not necessarily cover the losses. So, the whole
bank defaults when either the home or the branch is insolvent, and its affiliate does not have
enough cash flows to rescue, namely when either Rb and L̄h(T )− Fh < Fb − L̄b(T ) are true,
or R′h and L̄b(T )−Fb < Fh− L̄h(T ) are. In these cases, there is the possibility of government
bailout, with probability π. The event in which bailout of the branch may occur is
Qb ,
{
L̄b(T ) < Fb
L̄h(T )− Fh < Fb − L̄b(T ) (20)
The event in which bailout of the home bank may occur is
Q′h ,
{
L̄h(T ) < Fh
Fh − L̄h(T ) > L̄b(T )− Fb (21)
If the government does not bailout there are default costs. The home bank can maximize the
overall value by choosing how many deposits to raise directly and through its branch. The
separate value of debt and equity for the affiliates is given in Appendix A. The overall group
value is given again by the sum of the asset values L̄h + L̄b plus the government bailout puts
minus their default costs:
GV BR =
L̄h0 + π exp(−rT )Emax
{
0, Fh − L̄h(T ))1{Q′h}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
+
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[[
L̄h(T ) + max(0, L̄b(T )− Fb)
]
1{Q′h}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+
+L̄b0+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fb − L̄b(T ), 0)1{Qb})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout branch
+
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[[
L̄b(T ) + max(0, L̄h(T )− Fh)
]
1{Qb}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost branch
(22)
In the branch case the overall bank defaults when total assets are less than total debt in
face value: L̄h(T )+ L̄b(T ) < Fh +Fb. In the subsidiary case there will be situations when the
same condition holds but one subsidiary does not default because it can abandon the rescue
before defaulting. This happens when L̄h(T )− Fh < Fs − L̄s(T ). In this way the subsidiary
organization can save on default costs relative to the branch structure. For this reason,
we expect that the lack of limited liability on the branch level affects branch structures
negatively relative to subsidiary structures, exactly as the Sarig effect deprives mergers of
value. See Sarig (1985), Leland (2007), Balan-Estanol et al. (2012). But this intuition
could fail with endogenous leverage. Therefore, we distinguish between the exogenous and
endogenous cases below.
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5 Comparing group values of organizations; analytical
results
In this section we compare the different organizational structures when cash flows from
loans (in distribution), as well as other parameters, are the same. In section 5.1 we perform
the comparison analytically assuming that the level of deposits is the same in different
organizational structures. This case represents what we call constrained leverage. Equality
of deposits in face value can indeed be interpreted as a form of equal capital requirements
for all entities. The tax rate k is set to zero, to focus on the role of state bailouts and
default costs. In section 5.2 we endogenize leverage as well and show that even when the tax
rate is zero the bank can benefit from differentiating leverage across affiliates if it chooses
a one-way rescue structure. Such “debt diversity” in the presence of a positive tax rate is
explored further in the numerical analysis in section 6.20
5.1 Constrained leverage in all organizations
In a nutshell this section proves a basic feature of the model: subsidiary structures with
high levels of rescue/coinsurance have higher value for moderate bailout probabilities, while
structures with low levels of rescue/coinsurance have higher values for high bailout proba-
bilities.
Introduce the following
Assumption 2. Let the affiliates have the same size, i.e. the same initial value and
distribution of final loans (Lh0 = La0, Lh(T ) = La(T ), a = s, b in distribution), the same
positive leverage (Fh = Fa > 0, a = s, b). No taxes are paid (k = 0).
If we compare the one-way and the mutual rescue structures, we can conclude that
Proposition 5.1. Under Assumption 2, unilateral conditional rescues in subsidiary-home-
bank organizations are strictly worse than mutual conditional rescues, if α > 0 and π = 0,
while they are better when π = 1 and α > 0 or α = 0. If α > 0, there is a positive bailout
probability π∗above which unilateral rescue becomes better than mutual. Last, they have equal
value in a neighborhood of α = π = 0.
So, independently of how many deposits are collected in the affiliate, if there is no bailout
but default is dissipative (α > 0 and π = 0), it is better to provide mutual rescue in case
one affiliate becomes insolvent, instead of leaving it alone. Mutual rescue saves on default
costs in the absence of state bailouts. When there is external bailout with certainty or when
default is not dissipative (π = 1 and α > 0 or α = 0), mutual rescue is not a rational
strategy. Above a given likelihood of state bailout (π*), mutual rescue is not any more
rational if default is dissipative (α > 0). Instead, the group value is enhanced if internal
rescues are limited to go one way. .
If we compare the branch and the subsidiary with mutual rescue organizations, we get
the following:
20Proofs of Propositions are in Appendix B.
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Proposition 5.2. Under Assumption 2, the subsidiary organization (with mutual rescue) is
strictly preferable to the branch, for every α > 0, when 0 ≤ π < 1; when α = 0 or α > 0 and
π = 1, they have equal value.
The Proposition states that in all cases of dissipative default costs and some degree of
uncertainty about the bailout, the bank will prefer the subsidiary organization even when
there is commitment to mutual rescue.
Putting together Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, it is easy to assess the following:
Corollary 5.1. Under Assumption 2, if α > 0, there exists a bailout probability π∗ above
which the subsidiary organization with unilateral rescue is strictly preferred to the subsidiary
with mutual rescue, which in turn is preferred or equivalent to the branch organization.
The comparison between two stand alone banks and the same banks (in terms of as-
sets) once they become affiliated within a group with one way or mutual insurance is quite
straightforward too. It can be demonstrated that:
Proposition 5.3. Under Assumption 2, organizing a bank as a stand-alone entity provides
greater value than organizing it as a subsidiary - with unilateral or mutual rescue - if default
is not dissipative and there is a positive probability of bailout (α = 0 and π > 0) or, for any
level of default costs, if the probability of bailout is one (α ≥ 0, π = 1). The value of the
subsidiary organization is greater when default is dissipative but the probability of bailout is
null (α > 0 and π = 0). Under dissipative default costs, there is a positive bailout probability
π∗∗ above which stand alone banks are more valuable than subsidiaries with one-way rescue.
The stand alone organization becomes more valuable than subsidiaries with mutual rescue
when π = π∗∗∗, where π∗∗∗ ≤ max(π∗, π∗∗).
The visual representation of Propositions 1-4 for the case when α > 0 is in Figure 1.
Insert here Figure 1
In the Figure the value GV j, j = OWR, MR, BR, SA, is on the vertical axis while
the probability of bailout, π, increases along the horizontal axis. The Figure illustrates the
pairwise comparisons in the Propositions. The interSection points π∗∗ < π∗∗∗ < π∗, may
also be ordered as π < π∗∗∗ < π∗∗. The general pattern is not affected by the order of these
intersection points.
The shaded area for the value of the branch structure, GV BR, reflects that we cannot
order its value relative to the stand alone banks and the subsidiary with one way rescue
for relatively low values of the bailout probability, π, when there are positive default costs.
We know that when α = 0 and π = 0 all organizational structures have the same value.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 we can say that when (α > 0 and π = 0) the mutual
rescue subsidiary structure is strictly more valuable than any of the other organizations
but we cannot rank the branch organization relative to the one way rescue subsidiary and
the stand-alone organizations. As the bailout probability increases when there are positive
default costs the value of the stand-alone stucture increases faster than the value of the one-
way rescue subsidiary organization, which increases faster than the mutual rescue subsidiary
organization. At very high bailout probabilities the ordering of these three organizational
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structures have been reversed. The ambiguity for the value of the branch structure relative
to the one-way rescue subsidiary structure and the two stand-alones can be understood
in terms of coinsurance and contamination as a result of unlimited rescue in the branch
structure. Banal-Estanol et al. (2013) show how a branch structure in comparison with two
stand-alone banks provides coinsurance that reduces default costs. However, contamination
is also possible because large losses in one affiliate can drag the whole branch structure into
default as a result of the unlimited coinsurance. This contamination effect does not occur in
subsidiary structures and stand-alone banks under limited liability. Within our framework
subsidiary structures have the advantage relative to stand-alone banks that they benefit from
coinsurance gains in terms of default costs.21
Since the comparisons in this section are based on the assumption that the face value of
debt, F , is the same in each affiliate, value differences between structures are explained by
differences in the interest rate on deposits, which reflect expected default costs and bailout
expectations. Default costs are different across organizations even with the same leverage
because of the differences in rescue. The value of the bailout put also kicks in differently
because the inability to survive based on the group coinsurance is different across rescue
arrangements, even for the same leverage.
5.2 Unconstrained leverage
In this section we derive one analytical result with respect to endogenous leverage in different
organizational structures, when the tax rate is still null, the deposit interest rate remains
endogenous, and parameters and loan distributions across affiliates remain the same. We
establish conditions for ”debt diversity” in the sense that the bank chooses different leverage
for the two affiliates. Debt diversity is of concern since it affects the affiliates’ default and,
thereby, expected default costs and the expected value of bailouts. Debt diversity will be
explored more fully in section 6 where the tax rate is positive.
The one organizational structure that is naturally asymmetric with respect to rescue
policy is the subsidiary organization with one-way internal rescue. Intuitively, its value
can be increased by moving deposits from the non-insured affiliate to the internally insured
affiliate. Thereby, the subsidiary-structure with one-way rescue achieves ”debt diversity.”
For simplicity, let the loans of the two affiliates be independent. The following Proposi-
tion, the proof of which is in Appendix A:
Proposition 5.4. Let k = 0, α > 0, 0 < π < 1. Two banks with independent loans, which
are optimally levered and decide to set up a one-way rescue structure, create debt diversity
at the margin. The potentially rescued affiliate is more levered than the rescuing affiliate and
the group’s overall value is greater than the value of two stand-alone banks.
In the next section we will see that debt diversity arises as a result of the interest tax
shield as well as default costs.22
21The value differences between the various organizations can be split into coinsurance gains and risk
contamination, where the coinsurance gains are the reductions in default costs or the higher bailout revenues
due to rescue, while risk contamination is the increase in default costs due to the fact that one entity can
drag the other into default.
22Luciano and Nicodano (2014) obtained this result for the one-way rescue case, with no bailout.
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6 Numerical analysis with endogenous leverage
In order to fully analyze the role of endogenous leverage we apply a numerical method for
finding the face value of debt that maximizes group value.23 In section 6.1 we choose a
Gaussian distribution for returns on loans G and we specify a number of numerical cases;
each case represents a set of values for tax rate, bailout probability and default costs. The
numerical optimization procedure is applied in section 6.2 under the assumption that pa-
rameter values are the same across the two affiliates. The optimized market values for debt
and equity, the value of the bailout put, expected default costs and consequently the group
value of the bank will be calculated for each organizational structure. In section 6.3 the
bailout probabilities differ for the two affiliates.
We find that the analytical Propositions in section 5 with exogenous leverage are robust
to endogenization of leverage as long as the probability of state bailout is moderate and
the same for the two affiliates. The subsidiary structure with mutual rescue is the structure
of choice with both exogenous and endogenous leverage. Under the same condition, the
result that the subsidiary structure with one-way rescue is more valuable than the stand-
alone structure is robust. We can not rank the branch structure relative to the one-way
rescue structure and the stand alone structure with exogenous leverage, but with endogenous
leverage both the subsidiary structures are preferred to the branch structure, which has
greater value than the stand-alone structure. This result with endogenous leverage reflects
the subsidiary structures’ ability to take advantage of debt diversity.24 We see below that
a high bailout probability for all affiliates induces all the structures to push leverage as far
as possible with the result that we cannot clearly rank their relative values.Even if the high
bailout probability applies only to one affiliate, the other affiliate that may enjoy rescue also
increases its leverage.
6.1 Financial synergies and group values
The maximization problems to be solved are obtained by introducing Gaussian returns in
expression (17) for the unilateral rescue case for subsidiaries, expression (14) for the mutual
rescue case for subsidiaries and expression (22) for the branch case. We write the final asset
or loan value as L(T ) = L0 exp(Y ); log returns on loans Y have mean µ = (r−σ2/2)T and
variance σ2T . The initial value of the loans from each entity is normalized to L0 = 100.
Using Leland’s (2007) parametrization, which was calibrated to non-financial BBB firms, we
assume that the time horizon is five years, T = 5, the instantaneous riskless rate is 5%,the
correlation between asset returns in the two affiliates is 0.2. In order to tailor the parameter
23The optimization procedure works as follows: for each level of debt of the two affiliates, we compute the
fair value of debt as a fixed point, determine equity and value; we perform the computation over a grid of
possible leverages, making sure that we capture the global maximum, if it exists.
24 It can be noted that had we not excluded perfect correlation between returns on assets (Assumption
2), the subsidiary structure with mutual rescue, the branch structure and two stand alone banks become
identical, when assets have correlation 1. In this case there are no benefits of differentiating leverage within
these three organizational structures, which are symmetric with respect to rescue policy. Also, there are no
diversification benefits with respect to default costs. As a result internal rescue policies cannot affect group
values for these organizational structures if there is perfect correlation and bailout probabilities and default
costs are the same.
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choice to financial firms, we set σ = 5% per year. This asset volatility is taken from a seminal
paper for financial intermediaries (Marcus and Shaked, 1984). We take the conservative 5%
parameter in comparison to the most recent parameter for non-financial firms obtained by
Schaefer and Straebulaev (2008) to reflect the discrepancy between financial and non financial
firms illustrated in Marcus and Shaked,1984.
To compare financial synergies in different organizational structures when leverage is
optimally chosen we vary the tax rate, k, as well as default costs, α, and the probability of
bailout, π. If not stated otherwise, these parameters are the same across affiliates.25
In the base case in Table 1, the parameter k is 5%, π is 5% and α is 15%. These initial
values are relatively low. A low tax rate can be rationalized on the grounds that the effective
tax rate is rarely as high as the nominal corporate tax rate. The default cost parameter is
initially set slightly below the 20 percent used by Leland (2007).
The state bailout probability is difficult to assess. Our starting point is 5% under the risk-
neutral measure. The probability represents an average across types of debt with different
seniority and explicit or implicit insurance coverage. The Figure is consistent with the
relatively small difference in ratings (1-3 notches) between so called stand-alone ratings
and ratings incorporating the likelihood of government support for unsecured bank debt as
reported in Schich and Kim (2012).
There is a wide range of estimates of probabilities of state bailouts. Dam and Koet-
ter (2012) estimate the probability as high as around 60 percent based on the frequency
of bailouts of insolvent banks. Brandao Marques et al. (2013) use implicit estimates of
probabilities based on ratings of ”stand-alone” banks relative to ratings incorporating the
likelihood of government support, They find that the probability was near zero through 2006.
then it jumped to around 40% during the crisis. We experiment with different probabilities
below.
In Tables 1-4, for each set of parameters we show the face value of deposits, F , the market
value of deposits, D0, leverage defined as the market value of debt relative to the market
value of equity, D0/E0, default costs for each affiliate, the group value of the bailout put and
the group value, GV = D0 + E0.
The case of a zero tax rate is not included in the numerical cases below because the
optimal leverage with k = 0 tends to go to either zero or infinity. In conventional capital
structure analysis the optimal leverage is the result of a trade-off between the interest tax
shield and expected default costs. In our analysis bailout adds a second benefit from leverage.
Under the assumption that the tax rate is positive there is an interior solution for leverage as
a result of the non-linear relationship between the tax rate and the benefit of the tax shield.
Insert here Tables 1-4
In Table 1 we present the base case with relatively low values for all parameters. A
first observation is that the subsidiary structures with one-way as well as mutual rescue
choose to shift most of the deposits to one subsidiary. This ”debt diversity,” which we
established analytically for unilateral rescue structures above for k=0 appears for mutual
25The numerical cases analyzed below are robust to the choice of other levels of volatility (equal across
affiliates) and correlation.
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rescue structures as well when k > 0. Tax benefits of debt can be maximized by concentrating
leverage to one of the subsidiaries. The mutual rescue structure can take advantage of the
interest tax shield by imitating unilateral rescue by pushing leverage high in one affiliate
while keeping the leverage and, therefore, the need for rescue low in the other affiliate.
The stand-alone banks are by definition not able to take advantage of debt diversity.
The branch structure chooses some debt diversity - something that we could not establish
analytically - but much less than the subsidiary structure because the branch structure is
more sensitive to increasing default costs.
A second observation in the first panel is that the subsidiary structure with mutual rescue
has the highest group value, and that both the subsidiary structures have higher GV s than
the branch and the stand-alone structures. The subsidiary structures are best able to take
advantage of financial synergies by adjusting leverage. The default costs of the mutual rescue
structure are higher than the costs for the one-way structure but this difference is more than
offset by the higher value of the bailout put for the mutual rescue case. The differences
between the different structures are small at these parameter values.
In Table 2 we push the default costs from 15% to 25%. The GV s become smaller but the
comparisons among the different structures remain unchanged. In Table 3 we raise the tax
rate to 10 percent while other parameters remain the same as in Table 2. The GV s fall as a
result of the higher tax rate on the asset return but in order to compare financial synergies
we deduct the tax rate times the value of the assets (200) in the last two rows in the different
panels. These rows in Table 3 in comparison to Table 2 show that financial synergies increase
as a result of the greater tax benefit from debt financing. The pattern of the results does
not change, however. The subsidiary with mutual rescue remains the most valuable ahead
of the one-way rescue structure, the branch structure and the two stand-alones.
The probability of state bailouts is increased in Table 4. The power of this parameter on
the choice of leverage is substantial. If we increase the probability to 10 percent we do not
obtain an interior optimum face value below 500 for any affiliate. For this reason we increase
the probability to 7 percent in Table 4. Even so there is no interior optimum face value
below 500 unless we also increase the default cost parameter to 50 percent as we have done
in Table 4.26 It can be seen that GV s remain similar in magnitude to those with default
costs of 25 percent when the bailout probability is increased to 7 percent. As noted, the
power of the bailout probability for choice of leverage can be explained by its indirect impact
on reduced default costs in combination with its direct impact on the value of the bailout
put.
The higher bailout probability in Table 4 does not affect the comparisons among the
structures qualitatively. The GV of the mutual rescue structure remains the most valuable
ahead of the one way and the branch structures. The value of the bailout put for the mutual
structure, in particular, increases relative to the previous cases.
26If we increase the volatility to 20 percent, which may be realistic in times of crisis, we obtain interior
solutions even at a 40 percent probability of bailout.
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6.2 Differentiating probabilities of state bailouts
In this section we increase the probability of bailout of the home affiliate to 50% while the
probability for the other affilate remains at 5%. We limit the differentiation of parameters to
this case since changes in the bailout probability has the most powerful impact on leverage.
Insert here Table 5
Table 5 shows how the face values of debt in the affiliates, the values of the affilates and
the group values (GVs) are affected by the increase in the probability. We stop the search
for an optimum when the face value in an affiliate reaches 301. Thus, it is possible that the
optimal face value would be even higher when the reported value in the Table is 301. In this
cases the bank chooses to push debt financing to an extreme.
The two subsidiary structures (OWR and MR) and the stand-alone structure (2SA)
behave in the same way with respect to the debt levels in the two affiliates. The 50 %
probability of bailouts provide incentives to push debt very high in the home affiliate. The
group values in these structures turn out to be the same. In other words, the differences in
rescue arrangements do not affect the relative values of these three structures.
The branch structure behaves in a very different way. It pushes the debt level to extremes
in both affiliates. The difference between the bailout probabilities does not affect the distri-
bution of debt between the affiliates in this structure charaterized by joint default. There is
no gain from differentiation since the two branch affilates rescue each other till both default.
Another way of stating this is that in a branch structure the whole group takes advantage
of a high probability of bailout for one of the affiliates by creating high leveraage in both
affilates. Nevertheless, the group value for the branch structure remains below the group
values for the other structures, which can benefit from limited liability for each affilate. In
the next section we analyze additional aspect of risk-taking for the different structures.
7 Incorporating systemic risk: Is there a trade-off be-
tween bank value and expected loss?
We have so far focused on a value maximizing bank’s choice of its organizational structure.
From a regulatory point of view it is necessary to consider possible externalities of a bank’s
activities. Most observers consider contagion effects of a bank’s default a negative externality
that banks’ do not incorporate in decisions with respect to risk. Contagion from a bank’s
default in the form of an increase in the default risk of other financial institutions is a source
of systemic risk. In practice the systemic effect of a bank’s default would depend on the
magnitude of the losses to creditors as well as the structure of its liabilities to households,
firms and other financial institutions. Interconnectedness with other financial institutions is
one aspect that generally is thought to increase systemic risk.
The systemic effects of a bank’s default in our framework can be expressed as
K ×DEL = K(F exp(−rT )−D0)
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where F exp(−rT ) − D0 is the discounted expected loss (DEL) to creditors, namely the
difference between the present value of the bank’s debt as a safe asset F exp(−rT ) and
its actual no-arbitrage value D0. The exact expressions for the different organizations are
given in Appendix C. K represents bank-specific factors affecting the systemic impact of a
loss of a particular size. The bigger is the interbank exposure of a bank, the bigger K will
be, because, for a given loss, its impact on the system will be bigger. In what follows, to
compare different organizational forms, we assume that K is equal across them, namely their
interbank exposure is the same, and we focus the analysis on how the expected loss depends
on the organizational structure. The reader can well realize that, for the same expected loss,
if K is greater for a given affiliate, its final impact on the system will be emphasized. So,
intervank exposure works as a multiplier.
We begin the analysis in section 7.1 with a comparison of the expected losses in different
organizational structures in the numerical cases with unconstrained leverage presented in
section 6. Thereafter, we turn to expected losses with constrained leverage in section 7.2.
The results show that the subsidiary structure with mutual rescue has the highest expected
loss when leverage is unconstrained and, if leverage is constrained, at a relatively high bailout
probability. At a relatively low bailout probability this structure has the lowest expected
loss. A high bailout probability in one affiliate causes the highest expected loss in the
branch structure. A general result is that a leverage constraint mitigates the conflict of
interest between the bank’s and the regulator’s objectives.
7.1 Unconstrained leverage
Table 6, lines 1 to 4, shows the expected losses in the different organizational structures
when debt is endogenized under the same assumptions about parameters as in Tables 1-4.
For the subsidiary structures, (OWR and MR) there is one column for each affiliate. The
expected losses for the whole groups are shown on separate lines in each case. These lines
shows the sum of the two affiliates’ expected losses. In the branch structure (BR) only the
total expected loss is relevant since the affilates cannot default separately. The expected
losses of the stand-alone banks (SA) are shown individually as well as jointly.
Insert here Table 6
Comparing the expected losses of legal entities it can be seen that the home subsidiary
in the mutual rescue case has the highest expected loss in each of the first four cases wherein
parameters are equal across the affilates. The home (rescuing) subsidiary in the one-way
rescue case has the second highest expected loss. The branch bank has a lower expected loss
than any one of the subsidiary banks in spite of its larger size. One reason for this result is
that the branch bank exploits debt diversity to a lesser extent than the subsidiary structures.
It can be observed that the expected losses in the subsidiary structures occur almost
entirely in one of the subsidiaries. Thus, it does not make a difference for the comparisons
if we consider the sum of the expected losses in subsidiaries or the expected loss of the most
leveraged subsidiary.
The stand-alone banks individually face a slightly lower expected loss than the branch
bank while the sum of the expected losses of two stand-alone banks is approximately the same
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as the expected loss of the branch bank. The expected losses for the subsidiary structures
are mostly substantially higher than the expected losses of the branch and the stand-alone
banks. The exception occurs when the default cost parameter is at the highest level in case
4 where the subsidiary structure with one-way rescue has a relatively low expected loss as
well.
The data in Table 6 for expected losses can now be combined with the data for group
values in Tables 1-4 to illustrate in figures how group values and expected losses depend
on the organizational structure for each set of parameters. Figures 2 and 3 show the bank
values (GV ) vertically and the Expected losses (DEL) horizontally for the firt four cases
with equal parameters in Table 5.
The base case (1) with relatively low parameter values for the tax effect, default costs
and probability of bailout is shown in Figure 2. The branch bank almost dominates the
stand-alone banks since the GV for the BR structure is higher at very similar DELs. By
organizing the bank in subsidiaries it can increase its value but at the expense of systemic risk
as shown by the higher DEL values for the one-way rescue structure and the mutual rescue
structure. The subsidiary structures are able to exploit debt diversity and the probability of
bailouts at the expense of systemic risk.
Insert here Figure 2
Figures 3 a-c shows other cases with unconstrained leverage. In Figure 3a the default
cost parameter has been raised to 10 percent from 5 percent. The pattern from the base case
remains. The tax rate is increased to 10 percent in Figure 3b. The pattern remains similar
but the expected losses of the OWR and MR subsidiary structures are higher than in the
base case because incentives to diversify debt to take advantage of the interest tax shield are
higher.
Insert here Figure 3
Both the default cost parameter and the probability of bailout have been raised in Figure
3c relative to the base case. The higher default costs discourage leverage in all the structures.
The mutual rescue case still stands out with the highest expected loss and highest value while
the other three structures are similar in terms of both value and expected loss. The one-way
rescue structure (OWR) has higher value than the branch (BR) and the stand-alone (SA)
structures. Thus, if the regulator would want to constrain expected losses, it would prevent
mutual rescue, in particular. In more practical terms this would imply strict ring-fencing of
the capital in one subsidiary.
The conflict between bank group value (GV ) and expected loss (DEL) can be described
as a trade-off between these variables from a regulatory point of view. In Figures 2, 3a and
3b the differences in group values are small relative to the differences in expected loss. This
means that the costs for the bank of being constrained to organize itself as a branch bank
or two stand-alone banks to keep the expected loss low are relatively small. However, when
we raise the default costs and the bailout probability in Figure 3c the differences in values
are greater relative to the differences in expected loss. Thus, the cost to the bank of not
being able to form the mutual rescue structure relative to the benefit to the regulator of
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reducing the expected loss is relatively high when default costs and probability of bailout
are relatively high.
Figure 3d shows that the above results are not robust to the insertion of specific, targeted
constraints on leverage. In this case, all organizational forms are forced to lever as much as
it is optimal for a branch organization (81 and 108). This compelling constraint is the only
one able to challenge the natural tendency of mutual guarantees to be more valued but also
more risky: the suboptimality of leverage for the SA makes the couple of SA banks more
risky, while the low diversity of debt makes MR and OWR less risky than in the other cases
of Figure 3.
We turn now to the case of differential probabilities of bailout. This case was presented
in Table 5 and the expected losses in this case are shown in Table 6, line (5). The subsidiary
structures and the stand alone structure push leverage very high in the home entity that
benefits from the 50% probability of bailouts. The group values and the expected losses are
the same in these structures. The group value for the branch structure is slightly lower in
Table 5 b but the expected loss is much higher in this structure than in the other three. This
result is consistent with the observation from Table 5 that the branch structure increases its
leverage substantially in both affilates when one of them enjoys a high probability of bailout.
As a result the branch structures contribution to systemic risk becomes the greatest.
In this case with differentiated probabilities of bailouts there is not necessarily a conflict of
interest between the regulator’s objective to minimize systemic risk and the bank’s objective
to maximize group value unless the branch structure enjoys operational synergies, which we
have not incorporated in the analysis.
7.2 Constrained leverage
To explore the possibility that the conflict of interest between the bank and the regulator is
absent or alleviated with constrained leverage, we compare analytically expected losses of the
organizational structures when the face values of all affiliates are the same. The analytical
results for expected losses can be compared with the comparison of group values in Figure
1 and the Propositions in section 5. This is done in Appendix C below.
A result proved in section 5 and shown in Figure 1 was that for positive default costs
and relatively low values for the probability of bailout (π < π∗∗ in the case of the figure)
GVMR > GVOWR > GVSA
Appendix C shows that
DELMR < DELSA
DELOWR < DELSA
This means that for low values of the probability of bailout there is no conflict of interest
between the bank and the regulator, as far as MR or OWR versus SA are concerned, since
the former have greater value and smaller loss than the latter. The only conclusion we can
draw with respect to comparisons with the branch structure is that if GVBR > GVSA then
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DELBR < DELSA. In this case the systemic risk of the stand-alone banks is clearly the
highest while the group value is the lowest.
For relatively high values of the probability of bailout instead (π > π∗ in the case of the
figure) we know from section 5 that
GVSA > GVOWR > GVMR
Appendix C shows that
DELSA < DELMR
DELOWR < DELMR
so that there is no conflict of interest between the bank and the regulator, as far as SA and
MR are concerned. The former have greater value and smaller loss than the others. No
conclusion can be drawn when comparing BR and other structures.
The general result of this analysis is that the objective of the bank to maximize value
and the regulator’s objective to minimize systemic risk are consistent in several cases when
both the parameters and the face value of debt constraint are the same for the two affiliates.
Thus, the conflict of interest between the bank and the regulator that we observed with
unconstrained leverage is mitigated.
8 Summary, policy implications and further research
It can be assumed that banks like most corporations choose organizational structures with
the objective of maximizing value. Bank regulators, on the other hand, are primarily con-
cerned with systemic risk of bank failures. We have analyzed how banks can exploit financial
synergies through organizational choices with consequences for systemic risk in a model that
allows for an endogenous interest rate on bank debt and endogenous leverage. The organiza-
tional choices differ in their ability to exploit financial synergies generated by a probability
of state bailouts, reduced default costs and tax benefits from debt financing. In compar-
ison with existing literature on value effects of multi-affiliate banks’ choices, we include a
greater variety of organizational structures characterized by different internal arrangements
for rescue of an insolvent affiliate.
Value and risk effects of the choice of organizational structure have been analyzed with
endogenous leverage and interest rates as well as with a constraint on the face value of debt
relative to assets. This constraint can be thought of as a capital requirement on each affiliate.
Although capital requirements constitute the key regulatory instrument to reduce sys-
temic risk, the analysis with endogenous leverage remains relevant since there is strong
evidence that capital requirements are not completely effective.27
The subsidiary structure with limited liability and the possibility of mutual rescue is
value maximizing and, therefore, chosen by shareholders if leverage can be chosen optimally.
The subsidiary structure with one-way rescue is also more valuable than the branch and the
stand-alone structures. The value advantage of the subsidiary structure with mutual recue
27See the corresponding footnote above.
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holds in the presence of effective capital requirements as well, if the probability of state
bailouts is low or moderate.
The two subsidiary structures with internal rescue arrangements also generate the highest
systemic risk with endogenous leverage as long as the probability of bailout is the same for
each affiliate. Both the probability of a state bailout and the ability to differentiate leverage
across affiliates contribute to this result. It implies that there is a conflict between the
bank’s objective to maximize the value of financial synergies and the regulator’s objective
to minimize systemic risk. The regulator would prefer stand-alone banks without rescue
arrangements while the banks would prefer the subsidiary structures; in particular the one
with mutual rescue.
The conflict of interest between the regulator’s and the bank’s objectives is mitigated or
eliminated when the regulator can impose constraints on leverage through effective and equal
capital requirements across affiliates. At a low probability of state bailout the subsidiary
structures are preferred over stand-alone banks while the stand-alone banks are preferred
over subsidiaries with mutual rescue if the probability of bailout is high.
With endogenous leverage is that the systemic risk associated with a branch structure
increases greatly relative to the other structures when the probability of bailout differs be-
tween affiliates. The reason is that the branch structures with unlimited internal rescue have
incentives to push leverage high in both affiliates based on a high probability of bailout in
only one of the affiliates. Although the branch structure is not the bank’s value maximiz-
ing choice based on financial synergies alone, this result has relevance because a bank may
choose a branch structure to exploit operational sysnergies.
Many large banks are organized as bank holding companies across countries and financial
services. These structures are consistent with mutual rescue arrangements when they are
financially integrated as they often are.28 The financial integration among subsidiaries within
these holding companies suggests that they can adjust leverage across subsidiaries as well
as rescue arrangements. If so, they are also sources of systemic risk. This observation
rationalizes the proposed reforms of bank organizations in the form of ring-fencing of capital
within subsidiary structures. On the other hand, if capital requirements are effective and
similar across affiliates, ring-fencing that creates stand-alone banks from a financial point of
view lies in the interest of both banks and regulators only if the probability of state bailouts
is high.
Carmassi and Herring (2015) and Alexander (2015) have noted that large bank holding
companies with many subsidiaries sometimes are de facto branch structures and similar to
traditional universla banks. The branch like organization of legally separated subsidiaries
is explained by a strong operational integration with the implication that the subsidiries
cannot default individually.29 As noted above the branch organization, wherein all affiliates
default jointly, has strong incentives to create high leverage in the whole organization and,
thereby, systemic risk if only one affiliate has a high probability of bailout. In this case the
regulatory authority has an incentive to separate the affilates to reduce sytemic risk although
28Carmassi and Herring (2015) provide examples of Bank Holding Companies with more or less financially
integrated structures.
29Carmassi and Herring (2013) for instance notes that high default costs in the Lehman Brothers insolvency
in 2008 was caused by the close integration of subsidiaries, which enabled Lehman to book assets in ways
that obscured the true values of the different subsidiaries.
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the private value of the bank will be reduced.
The thrust of organizational reform efforts in the US, UK and the EU is to ring-fence
traditional commercial banking financially as well as operationally. The proposed reforms
appear to imply requirements for one-way rescue of commercial banking subsidiaries from
subsidiaries conducting investment banking and other non-traditional financial activities
while rescue in the opposite direction would not be permitted. Our analysis shows that
such ring-fencing many times does not reduce systemic risk relative to branch organizations
and stand alone banks if the bank subsidiaries can choose leverage. With effective capital
requirements the effects on systemic risk depends on the probability of state-bailouts.
Both the US and the EU have implemented reforms with the objective of reducing the
probability of bailouts of large as well as small banks. These reforms30 have not been put to
the test and their credibility has been questioned by many observers (Barth and Wihlborg,
2015). There are indications that the probability of bailout has declined as noted in Schich
and Kim (2012) but there is little doubt that the probability of bailout for large financial
institutions remains substantial.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in several directions.
First, debt can be tranched in different seniority levels, that can be guaranteed or non-
guaranteed. For any specific organizational form, the interplay between seniority and guar-
antees from other affiliates can be specified,31 and possibly optimized to minimize default
probability or maximize group value.
Second, the assumption that the parameters describing default costs, tax rates and return
volatility are the same for the two affiliates should be relaxed. An obvious extension of the
analysis would be to consider differences in parameter values to capture the complexity of
cross-border banks and banks involved in a variety of financial services. A first attempt in
this direction is in Luciano and Wihlborg (2016).
Last but not least, for a given expected loss, we argued above that the greater the inter-
bank exposure, the greater the systemic impact of that loss. The model built in this paper
parametrizes interbank exposure, since the focus of the study is on the internal (parent-
subsidiary versus branch) rescue mechanism and its effect, through endogenous leverage,
on value and risk taking. However, a future extension could model that exposure explic-
itly, optimize it too, and see whether different organizations should take different interbank
exposures.
30We are referring to the Orderly Liquidation procedures in the Dodd-Frank Act and the Single Resolution
Mechanism in the EU.
31We anticipated on that in footnote 17.
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9 Appendix A: Values to stakeholders, branch case
This Appendix reports the values of debt and equity of the branch and its home bank.
Payoffs to equity and bond holders resemble the subsidiary cases, whenever rescue or bailout
occurs. They differ when insolvency occurs, because insolvency is always joint, and default
costs are paid on both the assets of the bank originally in default and the assets transferred
from the other affiliate. We have the following expression for the branch debt:
D0b = +exp(−rT ) [Fb − Emax(0, Fb − Lb(T ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value without bailout and rescue
+
+exp(−rT )E
{
min (Lh(T )− Fh, Fb − Lb(T )) 1{Rb}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rescue received
+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fb − Lb(T ), 0)1{Qb}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout
+
− exp(−rT )(1− π)αE
[
[Lb(T ) + max(0, Lh(T )− Fh)] 1{Qb}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default costs
,
The home-bank equity is
E0h = exp(−rT )Emax [Lh(T )− Fh, 0]
− exp(−rT )E
{
min (Lh(T )− Fh, Fb − Lb(T )) 1{Rb}
}
,
The home-bank debt is
D0h = +exp(−rT ) [Fh − Emax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value without bailout and rescue
+
+exp(−rT )E
{
min (Lb(T )− Fb, Fh − Lh(T )) 1{R′h}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rescue received
+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fh − Lh(T ), 0)1{Q′h}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout
+
− exp(−rT )(1− π)αE
[
[Lh(T ) + max(0, Lb(T )− Fb)] 1{Q′h}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default costs
.
The branch equity is
E0b = exp(−rT )Emax [Lb(T )− Fb, 0]
− exp(−rT )E
{
min (Lb(T )− Fb, Fh − Lh(T )) 1{R′h}
}
,
The sum gives GVBR.
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10 Appendix B: Comparing group value of organiza-
tions; analytical results
This Appendix proves Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. There are no taxes (k = 0), so that
L̄i = Li, i = s, h, both at time 0 and at time T , in all states of the world.
We start from Proposition 5.1.
Proof. Let us compare the values of the unilateral subsidiary arrangement and the mutual
one, when the home bank and the affiliate have the same and positive level of deposits, cash
flows of the affiliates are equally distributed and k = 0. The values are given in the main
text. The value of the unilateral arrangement is smaller than the mutual arrangement if and
only if the bailout put net of default costs in the home bank - with no support form the
affiliate - is smaller than when the subsidiary offers rescue, i.e.
π exp(−rT )Emax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
<
π exp(−rT )Emax
{
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{Qh}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home w/ mutual support
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home w/ mutual support
. (23)
The event Qh is not empty, under Assumption 1. Whenever 0 < π < 1, this makes the
expectation which represents bailout on the left hand side greater than on the right hand
side; the same for default costs (in absolute value), if α > 0, 0 ≤ π < 1. So, the difference
on the left hand side can be greater, equal or smaller than the oneoin the right hand side.
However, the overall inequality in (23) holds, for any positive value of α, if π = 0, while the
opposite inequality holds for π = 1, and for any α > 0, or α = 0. The two sides are equal
when α = π = 0 and in a neighbourhood of it. Since the direction of the inequality (23)
changes when π goes from 0 to 1 and α stays positive, and both its left and right-hand side
are continuous in π, there is a positive bailout probability, which we call π∗, above which
mutual guarantees become worse than unilateral. This concludes the proof.
Consider now Proposition 5.2.
Proof. Since cash flows from loans Ls and Lb are the same (in distribution), Ls = Lb., call the
common value of the latter L. Note that the bailout events coincide for the two organizations,
i.e. the sets Qs = Qb, Qh = Q
′
h coincide for the two organizations. Let us compare the values
of the mutual subsidiary and the branch arrangement, which are respectively
GVMR = Lh0
+π exp(−rT )Emax
[
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+L0+
+π exp(−rT )E
[
max(F − L(T ), 0)1{ Qs})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
L(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
,
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and
GVBR = Lh0 + π exp(−rT )Emax
[
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{ Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
+
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
[Lh(T ) + max(0, L(T )− F )] 1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+
+L0+
+π exp(−rT )E
[
max(F − L(T ), 0)1{Qs})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout branch
+
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
[L(T ) + max(0, Lh(T )− Fh)] 1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost branch
(24)
The former is greater than the latter if and only if
−α(1− π)E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home s
−(1− π)αE
[
L(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
>
−α(1− π)E
[
[Lh(T ) + max(0, L(T )− F )] 1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home b
+
−(1− π)αE
[
[L(T ) + max(0, Lh(T )− Fh)] 1{Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost branch
.
In the subsidiary case, default costs are paid only on the home or the subsidiary cash flows.
In the branch case, they also affect the asset transfers from the affiliate (max(0, L(T )−F )) or
from the home bank (max(0, Lh(T )−Fh)). As a consequence, default costs in the subsidiary
organization are smaller (in absolute value) than default costs in the branch organization,
for positive values of α and 0 ≤ π < 1, and the previous inequality is satisfied. It follows that
the subsidiary organization is more valuable than the branch. When α = 0, or π = 1, α > 0,
the two become the same. This concludes the proof.
Last, let us prove Proposition 5.3, which compares two SA banks with a unilateral and
mutual-rescue organization, with no taxes (k = 0).
Proof. Let us compare the values of the stand alone and unilateral subsidiary arrangement.
The home bank has the same deposits (in distribution) in both cases. If we already name
the two affiliates ”home” and ”subsidiary” when they are stand-alone banks, the values of
the two arrangements are respectively
GV2SA = Lh0
+π exp(−rT )Emax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home as SA
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home as SA
+Ls0+
+π exp(−rT )E {max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary as SA
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
Ls(T )1{Ls(T )<F s}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary as SA
,
(25)
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and
GVOWR = Lh0
+π exp(−rT )Emax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home
+Ls0+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)1{ Qs})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
Ls(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
.
(26)
The difference in value between the SA arrangement and the unilaterally-guaranteed group
is
(GV2SA −GVOWR) exp(rT )
= + πE {max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary as SA
− πE
{
max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)1{Qs})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)αE
[
Ls(T )1{Ls(T )<F s}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary as SA
+ (1− π)αE
[
Ls(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
.
(27)
Since the returns on loans satisfy Assumption 1, Qs is not empty. It is also a subset of
Ls(T ) < Fs. This means that, in absolute value, both the bailout put and default costs are
smaller in the unilateral case than in the SA one. Since they show up with different signs,
the trade-off between them depends on the parameters α and π. If α = 0 and π > 0, only
the first two terms in the above expression are non-null, and the value of the SA is greater
than the value of a unilateral insurance. The same situation arises when π = 1, α ≥ 0. If
π = 0 and α > 0, only the last two terms in the above expression are non-null, and the value
of the SA is smaller than the value of a unilateral insurance. Because of continuity of the
above expression, it follows that there is a π∗∗ above which the SA value becomes greater
than the unilateral one. Let us now compare the SA value, given above, and mutual value,
i.e.
GVMR = Lh0
+π exp(−rT )Emax
{
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{Qh}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home w/mutual support
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home w/mutual support
+Ls0+
+π exp(−rT )E
{
max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)1{ Qs})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)α exp(−rT )E
[
Ls(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
.
(28)
The difference is
(GV2SA −GVMR) exp(rT ) =
31
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
+πEmax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home as SA
− πEmax
{
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{Qh}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home w/mutual support
−α(1− π)E
[
Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home as SA
+ α(1− π)E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home w/mutual support
+ πE {max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary as SA
− πE
{
max(Fs − Ls(T ), 0)1{ Qs})
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout subsidiary
−(1− π)αE
[
Ls(T )1{Ls(T )<F s}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary as SA
+ (1− π)αE
[
Ls(T )1{ Qs}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost subsidiary
.
(29)
Since returns on loans satisfy Assumption 1, the event Qh (in which the home is not rescued
by its subsidiary) is not empty. Within each line the first term is greater than the second,
in absolute value. As above, let us analyze the difference in value by changing α and π.
If α = 0 and π > 0, only the first and third line in the above expression are non-null, and
the value of the SA is greater than the value of a mutual rescue. The same situation arises
when π = 1, α ≥ 0. Since in these cases the difference between the unilateral and mutual
arrangement is
+π exp(−rT )Emax(0, Fh − Lh(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home as SA
− π exp(−rT )Emax
{
(0, Fh − Lh(T ))1{Qh}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
government bailout home w/mutual support
> 0,
we can see that the SA arrangement is preferable to the unilateral, which in turn is better
than the mutual (as we knew from the corresponding Proposition). If π = 0 and α > 0, only
the second and fourth lines are non-null, and the value of the SA is smaller than the value of
a mutual insurance. It was also smaller than the unilateral one in that case. The difference
between the unilateral and mutual arrangement in this case is
−α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<Fh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home as SA
+ α(1− π) exp(−rT )E
[
Lh(T )1{Qh}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
default cost home w/mutual support
< 0,
so that the stand alone value is smaller than the unilateral and the latter is smaller than the
mutual (as we knew from Proposition 1). Because of continuity of the above expressions,
there is a π∗∗∗ above which the SA value becomes better than the mutual one, which is better
than the branch. Using Proposition 2 and the comparison between the unilateral and stand
alone, such π∗∗∗ is smaller or equal than the maximum between π∗ and π∗∗. This concludes
the proof.
11 Appendix C: DELs
The aim of this Appendix is to study the relationship between the discounted expected loss
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and the group value for alternative structures, when Assumption 2 holds, the face value of
debt is exogenously given and equal across affiliates, and k = 0. We call this relationship
the frontier.
The discounted expected loss for a group:
DEL := 2F exp(−rT )− (D0i +D0j), (30)
where F is debt face value, equal for the two affiliates, D0i D0j are specified in each of
organizational structure.
We consider the following alternative organizations:
• Stand alone banks, SA. In (30), D0i = D0j = D0sa represents debt value of the single
stand alone bank.
• Mutual rescue, MR; here D0i = D0h is the home debt value, while D0j = D0s is the
subsidiary debt value .
• Unilateral, OWR; here D0i = D0h is the home debt value, while D0j = D0s is the
subsidiary debt value.
• Branch, BR; here D0i = D0h is the home debt value, while D0j = D0b is the branch
debt value.
11.1 Two SA banks
The discounted expected loss for two SA banks is given by:
DEL = 2(F exp(−rT )−D0sa),
where D0sa is debt value of the single bank affiliate.
Proposition 11.1. Under Assumption 2, in the SA bank case, the group value, the dis-
counted expected loss and the frontier are given in closed form as:
GVSA = 2(L0+exp(−rT )πE[max(0, F−L(T ))]−α(1−π) exp(−rT )E[L(T )1{L(T )<F}]), (31)
DELSA = 2 exp(−rT )(E[max(0, F − L(T ))](1− π)+α(1− π)E[L(T )1{L(T )<F}]), (32)
DELSA = 2(exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − L(T ))] + L0)−GVSA. (33)
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11.2 MR
In this case, the total (i.e., group) discounted expected loss is given by:
DEL = 2F exp(−rT )− (D0h +D0s), (34)
Debt values are given by D0h (home debt value) and D0s (subsidiary debt value) as given
in the main text.
Proposition 11.2. In the mutual rescue case, the group value, the discounted expected loss
and the frontier are given in closed form as:
GVMR = 2L0 + (35)
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))1{Q′}]− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[Lh(T )1{Q′}]
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))1{Q}]− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[Ls(T )1{Q}]
DELMR = exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))]) (36)
− exp(−rT )
(
E[(F − Lh(T ))1{R′}] + E[(F − Ls(T ))1{R}]
)
− π exp(−rT )
(
E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))1{Q′}] + E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))1{Q}]
)
+ α(1− π) exp(−rT )
(
E[Lh(T )1{Q′}] + E[Ls(T )1{Q}]
)
DELMR = −GVMR + 2L0 (37)
+ exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))])
− exp(−rT )
(
E[(F − Lh(T ))1{R′}] + E[(F − Ls(T ))1{R}]
)
,
11.3 OWR
In this case, the total discounted expected loss is given by:
DEL = 2F exp(−rT )− (D0h +D0s), (38)
Debt values are given by D0h (home debt value) and D0s (subsidiary debt value) and
their expressions are given in the main text.
Proposition 11.3. In the unilateral case, the group value, the discounted expected loss and
the frontier are given in closed form as:
GVOWR = 2L0 + (39)
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))]− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<F}]
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))1{Qs}]− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[Ls(T )1{Qs}]
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DELOWR = exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))])(40)
− exp(−rT )E[(F − Ls(T ))1{R}]
− π exp(−rT )
(
E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))1{Qs}]
)
+ α(1− π) exp(−rT )
(
E[Lh(T )1{Lh(T )<F}] + E[Ls(T )1{Qs}]
)
DELOWR = −GVOWR + 2L0 (41)
+ exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))])
− exp(−rT )E[(F − Ls(T ))1{Rs}],
11.4 BR
In this case, the total discounted expected loss is given by:
DEL = 2F exp(−rT )− (D0h +D0s), (42)
Debt values are given by D0h (home debt value) and D0b (branch debt value) as in the
main text.
Proposition 11.4. In the branch case, the group value, the discounted expected loss and the
frontier are given in closed form as:
GVBR = 2L0 + (43)
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))1{Qh′}]
− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[(Lh(T ) + max(0, Lb(T )− F ))1{Qh′}]
+ π exp(−rT )E[max(0, F − Lb(T ))1{Qb}]
− α(1− π) exp(−rT )E[(Ls(T ) + max(0, Lb(T )− F ))1{Qb}]
DELBR = exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + E[max(0, F − Lb(T ))]) (44)
− exp(−rT )E[min(Lh(T )− F, F − Lb(T ))1{Rb}]
− exp(−rT )E[min(Lb(T )− F, F − Lh(T ))1{Rb′}]
− π exp(−rT )
(
E[max(0, F − Lb(T ))1{Qb}] + E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))1{Qh′}]
)
+ α(1− π)exp(−rT )E[(Lb(T ) + max(0, Lh(T )− F ))1{Qb}]
+ α(1− π)exp(−rT )E[(Lh(T ) + max(0, Lb(T )− F ))1{Qh′}],
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DELBR = −GVBR + 2L0 (45)
+ exp(−rT ) (E[max(0, F − Lh(T ))] + E[max(0, F − Ls(T ))])
− exp(−rT )E[min(Lh(T )− F, F − Lb(T ))1{Rb}]
− exp(−rT )E[min(Lb(T )− F, F − Lh(T ))1{Rh′}],
11.5 Comparison of losses and values across organizations
Using the above expressions, it is easy to show that below π∗∗
GVMR > GVOWR > GVSA
and above π∗
GVSA > GVOWR > GVMR
Using the relationship between values and losses, namely the frontier in the above theorems,
one can show that below π∗∗
DELMR < DELOWR + exp(−rT )E[(F − Ls(T ))1{Rs}] < DELSA
so that
DELMR < DELSA
DELOWR < DELSA
as stated in the text.
Symmetrically, one can show from the previous expressions that beyond π∗
DELSA < DELOWR + exp(−rT )E[(F − Ls(T ))1{Rs}] < DELMR
which implies
DELSA < DELMR
DELOWR < DELMR
as stated in the text.
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Figure 1: Group value GV as a function of the probability of bailout π for default costs > 0,
case π∗∗ < π∗.
 
 
 
GV 
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S_MR 
S_MR = S_BR 
S_BR 
Figure 1: Group value (GV) and probability of bailout (π) for default cost > 0. 
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Figure 2: DEL and GV in the base case
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Figure 3: DEL and GV in the cases of Table 5, other than the base case.
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 1 
 
Table 1. Comparison of coinsurance arrangements with unconstrained leverage; 
Base case with k=5%, π=5%, α=15%. 
GV is group value. Highest GV in bold. 
 
Panel 1. 
α=15% 
    Sub_OWR          Sub_MR              BR              2SA 
F 1 202 1 207 84 112 90 90 
D0 0.779 156.14 0.779 158.83 65.42 87.16 70.06 70.06 
D0/E0 0.022 ∞ 0.024 ∞ 2.24 8.87 2.73 2.73 
Def. costs 0 0.1502 0 0.3019 0.0018 0.0533 0.0276 0.0276 
Bailout Put 0.055 0.223 0.001 0.0006 
GV 191.70 191.81 191.637 191.50 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of coinsurance arrangements with unconstrained leverage; 
Increasing default cost  
k=5%, π=5%, α=25%. GV is group value. Highest GV in bold. 
 
Panel 2. 
α=25% 
    Sub_OWR          Sub_MR              BR              2SA 
F 1 195 1 201 83 109 88 88 
D0 0.779 151.46 0,779 155.44 64.64 84.84 68.51 68.51 
D0/E0 0.020 1.5m 0.022 ∞ 2.13 7.23 2.48 2.48 
Def. costs 0 0.0803 0 0.2152 0.0016 0.0420 0.0239 0.0239 
Bailout Put 0.0176 0.1239 0.005 0.0004 
GV 191.64 191.69 191.613 191.471 
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